

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY R. J. Long DATE 9/24/81

PORTIONS DENIED AS INDICATED

TO : The Secretary

October 28, 1962

FROM : INR - Roger Hilsman

SUBJECT: Analysis of Khrushchev's Message

EXCISE

We have studied the full text of this morning's message from Khrushchev and have the following comments on it.

(1) On the face of it, the USSR has now accepted the President's proposal for the removal of Soviet offensive missiles from Cuba in exchange for US assurances to end the quarantine and not to invade Cuba.

(2) Khrushchev appears to interpret the President's letter as already constituting a US assurance against invasion, although he expands this assurance to include an end of exile activities hostile to the Castro regime. And, in consequence he asserts that the Soviet side of the arrangement (i.e. removing of the missiles and ending shipments of missiles) is already being implemented.

(3) Khrushchev indicates his willingness to have the Soviet dismantling of missiles now in Cuba subjected to verification by the UN; however, the method and extent of verification remain subject to further agreement. Khrushchev does not mention what precise method of verification he has in mind, but it should be recalled that in yesterday's letter (on the Turkish-Cuban trade-off) Khrushchev stated that supervisory personnel should be "representatives of the Security Council" and have the "confidence" of the Security Council, the US, the USSR, Cuba (and Turkey). Further, Cuba must give its permission for the inspection to occur.

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- 2 -


(5) The letter does not again mention the Turkish bases as part of any present arrangement; but it does indicate that the USSR intends at some point to press for some form of arrangement involving NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Note, however, that Khrushchev's references to an agreement for UN supervision is based on his October 27 letter in which dismantling of the Turkish bases is proposed.

(8) We note that while Khrushchev refers to some instruction said to be already in effect, for cessation of work at the missile sites, preliminary information indicates that as of October 27, such work was continuing and that the entire Soviet missile launching force was assuming an increasing, integrated operational posture.

CONCLUSIONS

(1) In general, the Khrushchev letter indicates great Soviet concern over the danger of war. The rapidity of the Soviet messages in the past few days suggests a Soviet awareness that time is running short and that the US may be planning further more drastic moves to secure removal of the Soviet missiles, whatever the consequences.

(2) Moscow may also feel that there are still opportunities not only to wessel on the terms of control in Cuba but also to raise demands for verification of the US assurances and on other points.



E.O. 12065
1-301(d)

(3) Khrushchev must know that the promised withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba under the proposed conditions will, whatever he says about his success in preventing US aggression against Cuba and saving world peace, be regarded as a clear defeat for Soviet policy. This will inevitably affect the relationships of policy makers in the Kremlin as well as the future conduct of Soviet foreign policy.

(4) Internal Soviet Implications



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- 4 -

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(5) In the international field.

Khrushchev's first concern will be to picture the events as a triumph for "peace-loving" Soviet foreign policy and for "socialism." He will thus argue that he has forestalled a US invasion while preserving the Castro regime and maintaining Soviet protection and support for it.

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